T H E WAYS I N W H I C H a person perceives that the events and outcomes in their life are under control is an increasingly important concept in health-related research. The most important development of the Locus of Control construct (Rotter, 1966) has been towards a multidimensional conceptualization of control, and Wallston, Wallston and DeVellis' (1978) introduction of the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale (MHLC) was a significant contribution to this development in terms of sources of control. In this article we suggest that further development of the construct for health research should include recognition of two distinct aspects of control beliefs, strategy and capacity beliefs, and we introduce a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and discriminant validity analysis to support such multidimensional measurement of control. Levenson (1972 Levenson ( , 1981 first challenged the unidimensionality of the Locus of Control construct by demonstrating that internal and external control are separate dimensions. Second, she showed that external beliefs consist of separate means of control, such as 'self', 'powerful others' and 'luck'. Wallston et al. (1978) demonstrated the validity of these three means of control in the context of health beliefs, with the introduction of the MHLC. Wallston, Stein and Smith (1994) further demonstrated a separate belief in control by means of the 'doctor', and in 1999, Wallston and colleagues added a scale that measures a belief in control by 'God'. Chaplin et al. (2001) used confirmatory factor analysis to conclude that, although the three external factors (God, powerful others and chance) are correlated, the four-factor solution (with one internal control factor) provides the best fit, and that these four sub-scales of the MHLC should be scored as separate dimensions.
Recently, theorists have considered aspects of the sense of control itself. Bonetti et al. (2001) conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of data from three measures of control: a generalized self-efficacy scale, a health competence scale and the MHLC (Wallston et al., 1978) . The results produced distinct factors that corresponded to the structure of the measures used, suggesting that these measures tap distinct aspects of control beliefs. This is not surprising as the measures were drawn from different theoretical approaches. Several theorists from various perspectives have described the sense of control as comprising quite separate beliefs, which may or may not interact to produce an effective sense of control. Perhaps the most well-articulated theory to propose this is by Skinner (1995 Skinner ( , 1996 ). Skinner's conceptualization has three essential elements: 'agents', 'means' and 'ends' of control. 'Agents' refers to individuals or groups that exert control. 'Means' refers to ways in which control can be exerted. 'Ends' refers to outcomes (desired or undesired) over which control is exerted. Using this distinction, three separate sets of beliefs can be identified. 'Strategy beliefs', which represent the relationship between the 'means' and 'ends', are beliefs that the 'means' in question can produce the 'ends' or outcome. Skinner (1996) states that Strategy beliefs are very similar to Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966) . The relationship between the 'agent' and 'means' is a 'capacity belief' about whether the person has access to the means in question. Skinner (1995 Skinner ( , 1996 maintains that the interaction between these two beliefs results in a 'sense of control', and to measure only one results in the loss of valuable information. For example, a person may believe that outcomes are controlled by personal ability, but if they do not believe they possess that ability then they will not have a sense of control. It may also be that a person does not believe that outcomes are controlled by personal ability. If this is the case, then, although they believe they possess the ability, they will not have a sense of control. Alternatively, a person may believe that outcomes are controlled by luck, and if they also believe that they are lucky this will give them a sense of control. Similar theories have been proposed by other authors (Bandura, 1977 (Bandura, , 1986 (Bandura, , 1997 Weisz & Stipek, 1982) . Skinner, Chapman and Baltes (1988) have provided support for this distinction using a measure of 'capacity beliefs' and 'strategy beliefs' for the means of 'effort', 'ability', 'teacher', 'luck' and 'unknown' in the educational context. Support in the health context comes from research showing an interaction of similar constructs. For example, Chambliss and Murray (1979) , found that in a weight loss programme, increased perceived self-efficacy resulted in weight loss only for those with internal Locus of Control, but weight gain for those with an external Locus of Control. Kaplan, Atkins and Reinsch (1984) found that Health Locus of Control similarly moderated the relationship between walking self-efficacy and walking compliance. The relationship between walking self-efficacy and walking compliance was significant for those with internal Health Locus of Control but not for externals. These findings support Skinner's (1996) theory and show the potential dangers of ignoring the multidimensional nature of control in applied settings. This is now being recognized by health researchers who have specified that the restricted definition and measurement of control used was a limitation in their investigations (e.g. Bailis, Segall, Mahon, Chipperfield, & Dunn, 2001; Chandola, Kuper, Singh-Manoux, Bartley, & Marmot, 2004) .
In summary, the multidimensionality of the Locus of Control construct has been developed in two important ways for applied work. The internal and external dimensions are usefully seen as distinct and furthermore both internal and external sources of control should be considered in terms of different means of control. The development of multidimensional approaches to control beliefs in the health domain by Wallston and colleagues (1978 Wallston and colleagues ( , 1994 Wallston and colleagues ( , 1999 provides support for the efficacy of this development. Recent theorizing suggests a further development: Locus of Control (as a strategy belief) is only one factor in the interaction with capacity belief, which produces a sense of control. These theories are not domain specific and furthermore, Bonetti et al. (2001) showed that the distinct constructs captured by different control measures are valid across different populations. Empirical work in the health area supports the importance of continuing to develop a multidimensional approach to control in the areas of specific disease outcomes, health-related behaviours or explanations of health inequalities in general populations. The aim of the present research is to contribute to the evidence for multidimensional theories of control. The relationship between capacity and strategy beliefs, although suggested by a number of theorists, has not been tested extensively and present scales used to measure control often include capacity and strategy items together (Skinner, 1995) . Support has been limited to date by the analysis of small sets of sub-scales, limited use of multivariate testing of hypotheses and the use of EFA without the more stringent application of CFA.
The first specific aim of the study reported here was to use confirmatory factor analysis to test a model of control beliefs based on Skinner's (1995) conceptualization of control, using a measure developed for use in the population health research area. The two predictions were that generalized control beliefs are held independently in regard to different means of control, and that capacity beliefs may be differentiated from strategy beliefs in regard to each of these means. The second aim was to test the validity of the measure's sub-scales by considering their relationships with three sub-scales of the MHLC and with measures of capacity control beliefs. We expected the sub-scales that purported to measure specific means to correlate more strongly together than with those measuring other means, and those that were theoretically developed to measure capacity beliefs of specific means to correlate together more strongly.
Method

Participants
The sample was randomly selected from the New Zealand Electoral Roll. Of 980 sampled, 592 responded (60%). Demographic characteristics which were compared with the last published New Zealand census (Statistics New Zealand, 1996) show that 47.3 per cent were male (1996 census, 49.1%), with a mean age of 46.7 (SD = 16.7) ranging from 18 to 98 (1996 census, M = 39.3) (SD = 17.1). More respondents identified themselves as NZ European/Pakeha (84.1%; 1996 census, 80.1%). Those who identify themselves as NZ Maori, Asian and Pacific Islanders were under-represented.
Measures
A measure of control to assess multiple means of control, and capacity and strategy beliefs for each means, was developed for this study (Multidimensional Sense of Control Scale, MSOCS; Baken, 2003) . The means were selected from those used in current measures (e.g. Levenson, 1972; Skinner et al., 1988) , those suggested by theorists (Scheier & Carver, 1985; Shapiro & Astin, 1998) and from the results of open-ended interviews in which people identified the means which they believed influenced outcomes in their lives. Capacity and strategy belief items were written for each means based on the definitions of Skinner (1995 Skinner ( , 1996 . These items were subjected to a content analysis, and EFA (on a different sample of 290 participants) to select a set of items that formed capacity or strategy beliefs sub-scales. Through this process some means were discarded, as the items written for some sub-scales did not perform as expected. Means that were excluded were God, Confidence, Effort and the Boss. Additionally, some decisions about which means to develop were made in response to the results of the open-ended interviews and the context of the research project which was investigating the relationship between socio-economic status and health. The means that were included in the final analysis were Ability, Family, Friends, Luck and Money. The items included in these sub-scales are detailed in Appendix 1.
Participants indicated their level of agreement with the statements on a 4-point scale (not at all true = 1, not very true = 2, sort of true = 3, very true = 4). Sub-scales were scored by calculating the mean score of relevant items so the possible range is from 1 to 4. A higher score on a capacity sub-scale indicates that the person believes they have more access to the means. A higher score on a strategy sub-scale indicates a belief that the means is more effective in producing the desired outcome. The means, SD, number of items and coefficient alpha for each sub-scale resulting from the CFA sample (N = 595; Baken, 2003) and test-retest reliability correlations from a separate sample (N = 42; Baken, 2003) are shown in Table 1 .
Other control measures strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree). Mean scores are calculated for each sub-scale so the possible range is 1-6. Higher scores indicate greater attribution of control to that source. Although Locus of Control theory describes strategy beliefs, the items in the MHLC include both elements of capacity beliefs and strategy beliefs. For example, the item 'I am in control of my health' speaks of the role of personal action in health and also implies that the person actually has the ability to yield that control. Similarly, the item 'My family has a lot to do with my becoming sick or staying well' goes beyond the potential of the family to influence the person's health, by implying that the family are also already acting. It should also be noted that the MHLC sub-scale labelled 'Chance Health Locus of Control', has three items related to luck, while the other three are more concerned with a fatalistic view of outcomes. Hence 'chance' and 'luck' are regarded as synonyms for the same construct. Results of convergent validity analyses (Sherbourne & Stewart, 1991) support the meaning of the scales. The MOS SSS largely concerns the availability of support, and accordingly stronger correlations with capacity beliefs than with strategy beliefs are expected. However, a number of the items imply that the support assists the respondent to achieve the desired outcome, and therefore it is likely that there will also be some relationship with strategy beliefs. 3. To compare the sub-scales with an existing measure of internal capacity, Schwarzer's Generalized Self-efficacy Scale (Schwarzer, Hahn, & Jeruselem, 1993) was included. This is a 10-item measure of perception of personal agency. Participants rate the extent to which each item applies to them on a 4-point scale (1 = not at all true, 2 = barely true, 3 = moderately true, 4 = exactly true). The mean score of all items gives a possible range of 1-4 with a higher score indicating a higher perception of personal agency. EFA and CFA studies reported by Schwarzer (1993) support the one dimensionality of the scale, and criterion-related and prognostic validity is also supported.
The above measures are supported by internal and test-retest reliability and validity data. The means, SD and coefficient alphas for the scales in the present study are provided in Table 1 .
Procedures
For the confirmatory factor analysis and validation study, participants were informed by letter about the study, their selection and a forthcoming letter and questionnaire. Five days later, all participants were sent the second letter, a questionnaire and a prepaid reply envelope. The letter included information about the study, participants' rights and how to indicate nonparticipation and no further reminders. One week later a postcard was sent to thank those who had returned the questionnaire, and inform others that their responses were still welcome. Three weeks later another letter, questionnaire and freepost reply envelope were sent to all participants who had not yet returned a questionnaire (completed or uncompleted).
Analysis
Five participants who had more than 50 per cent missing data were removed from the study. There were no missing data in the responses of 182 (31.1%) of the participants. On average each participant had 7.24 per cent (median = 2%) missing data and this was judged to be missing at random and replaced using a single imputation technique (EM). A CFA of the items was performed using structural equation modelling (AMOS 4.0; Arbuckle, 1999) to compare the fit of the hypothesized model with the fit of other theoretically possible models.
BAKEN & STEPHENS: CFA OF CONTROL BELIEFS 647
Results
The hypothesized model included ten constructs representing strategy beliefs and capacity beliefs for five means of control: Ability, Family, Friends, Luck and Money Strategy. Thus one of the means related to internal control (Ability) and four of the means related to external control. These constructs were allowed to correlate in the hypothesized model shown in Fig. 1 , because it was expected that beliefs regarding different aspects of control would be related.
Assumptions
The assumptions for structural equation modelling of independent observations, random sampling of respondents and linear relationships were met. However, scores on a number of the items were not distributed normally. Nine outliers were removed from the sample and transformations were performed which brought the normality within acceptable limits, although the assumption of multivariate normality was not met as assessed with Mardia's coefficient.
Model estimation
For all analyses parameter estimates were calculated using maximum likelihood (ML). Several studies have suggested that ML estimation is remarkably robust even when there is marked departure from multivariate normality (Huba & Harlow, 1987; Olsson, Foss, Troye, & Howell, 2000; Wang, Fan, & Willson, 1996) . However, because the assumption of normality was not met,'bootstrapping', in which successive samples are taken from the overall sample, was also used. The model is tested on all the sub-samples and the mean and variance of the bootstrap samples calculated. This approach is not based on the assumption of normal distribution and so more accurate results are calculated (Byrne, 2001; Hoyle & Panter, 1995) . This option produced essentially the same results as the ML analysis and so the ML results are presented for clarity.
Competing models
The models test two alternative concepts discussed in the introduction. One is the differentiation between capacity and strategy beliefs, and the other is the extent to which beliefs regarding external means are separate. Model A, which is shown in Fig. 1 , includes both hypotheses.
Models B, C and D assume no difference between capacity beliefs and strategy beliefs as in the MHLC (Wallston et al., 1978) , and so the capacity belief items and the strategy belief items for each means were specified to identify with the same sub-scale. For Model B, this suggests five sub-scales: one for each means. Model C, additionally collapses control beliefs regarding family and friends. Thus, Model C specifies only four sub-scales. Beliefs regarding family and friends are combined in social support measures (e.g. Sherbourne & Stewart, 1991) and the 'powerful others' sub-scales of multidimensional Locus of Control measures (Levenson, 1972; Wallston et al., 1978) . Model D, additionally combines all external means and suggests a separation only between internal means (Ability) and external means (Family, Friends, Luck and Money). Model D specifies only two sub-scales and tests whether there is a difference in people's beliefs regarding external means. See Table 2 for a summary.
Models E, F and G specify a difference between capacity beliefs and strategy beliefs. Model E, like Model C, specifies that Family and Friends Capacity items together form one subscale and likewise Family and Friends Strategy items form another sub-scale. Thus, Model E suggests eight sub-scales. Model F, like Model D, combines all items relating to external means across capacity and strategy, thus comprising four sub-scales. Model G, combines all means of control into one scale for strategy and one for capacity beliefs to form two sub-scales. The subscale in this model that includes all strategy beliefs is closest to representing the unidimensional conceptualization of Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966) .
Statistics used to analyse fit
The fit indices used for the six models are presented in Table 3 . Fit is often tested with the 2 statistic for which a non-significant result indicates that the sample covariance matrix is the same as that produced by the model. The 2 statistic is improved by using 2 /d.f. (Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977) . Results closer to 1 indicate a better fit, and up to 5 a reasonable fit (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985) . The Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) Table 3 shows that none of the models satisfy the 2 test of absolute fit and only Models A and E are within the acceptable fit range of the RMSEA. The 2 /d.f. values for Models A, B and E are below 5 indicating a reasonable fit.
Goodness of fit comparison
To compare the relative fit of the models 2 difference tests were used which allow statistical comparison of two nested models (Ullman, 2001 ). The models that separated capacity and strategy belief items were compared with models that collapsed these items into one construct. Models which kept capacity and strategy items separate were shown by 2 difference tests to have significantly better fit than their equivalent models which did not (Model C and Model E, To test the prediction that beliefs regarding means of control are different and may be measured with different sub-scales, the models that kept sub-scales for means separate were compared with models that did not. Models which separated the means of control were shown by 2 difference tests to have significantly better fit than their equivalent models which did not (Model B and Model C, ∆ 2 = 592. 
Convergent and discriminatory validity analysis
Pearson's r correlation coefficients for each of the MSOCS sub-scales with the Internal, Powerful Others and Chance sub-scales of the MHLC, Generalized Self-efficacy and the MOS SSS are shown in Table 4 .
The pattern of correlations supports the expectation that the sub-scales measuring specific means are more strongly correlated. The IHLC (internal control) was most strongly correlated with the two sub-scales of the MSOCS that measure internal control (Ability Capacity and Ability Strategy). The PHLC (Powerful Others) was most strongly correlated with the Family Strategy, Friends Strategy, Luck Strategy and Money Strategy sub-scales, which all assess external means of control. The CHLC (Chance) was most strongly correlated with the Luck Strategy sub-scale.
When considering the two external sub-scales of the MHLC: Powerful Others and Chance, there is a pattern of positive correlations of these sub-scales with the MSOCS Strategy subscales. This contrasts with the pattern of negative correlations for the same MHLC external sub-scales with the MSOCS Capacity sub-scales. This pattern was not evident for the internal sub-scales: both Ability Capacity and Strategy (MSOCS) were positively correlated, at a similar strength, with the Internal sub-scale of the MHLC.
The two measures of capacity beliefs, Generalized Self-efficacy (internal means) and MOS SSS (social support) did correlate more strongly with the capacity measures of the related means. Thus the Generalized Self-efficacy Scale was most strongly correlated with the Ability Capacity sub-scale of the MSOCS. The MOS SSS was most strongly correlated with the Family Capacity and Friends Capacity sub-scales. Interestingly, although the MOS SSS showed no relationship with Friends Strategy at all, it was 
Discussion
This analysis investigated the extent to which two hypotheses concerning control beliefs fitted the data provided by a nationally representative sample. A model of control beliefs was proposed which incorporated both hypotheses and then this model was compared with five competing theoretically driven models. The relative fit of the models provides support for the hypothesized model. The first hypothesis was that capacity beliefs and strategy beliefs are independently held, and items measuring the different constructs should not be combined into the same sub-scale. Structural equation modelling showed that the models which treated capacity and strategy belief items as separate (Models A, E and F) were a significantly better fit than their counterpart models, which combined capacity belief and strategy belief items into one sub-scale (Models B, C and D respectively).
This finding supports the theories of Bandura (1977 Bandura ( , 1986 Bandura ( , 1997 , Skinner (1995 Skinner ( , 1996 and Weisz and Stipek (1982) and suggests implications for research about control beliefs and health. In particular it shows that Locus of Control is only one aspect of a person's control beliefs and is distinct from their belief in the availability of the means of control and theoretically from their 'sense of control'. This broader understanding of control beliefs puts a responsibility on researchers to choose carefully their measures of control beliefs. It may not be appropriate to choose a Locus of Control measure simply because of its familiarity or its use in previous research. In addition, this finding suggests that Locus of Control is only part of the picture of control beliefs and it may not be appropriate to measure it alone. One of the practical limitations of choosing an appropriate measure is that while multidimensional measures of Locus of Control are available for use as measures of strategy beliefs, no multidimensional measure of capacity beliefs is readily available for use in the health domain. Two measures have been developed based on Skinner's (1995 Skinner's ( , 1996 model located within the educational domain. A more generalized measure of multidimensional control beliefs is currently being developed that is appropriate for use in health-related research (Baken, 2003) .
The second hypothesis incorporated into the model was that beliefs regarding different external means of control are not necessarily the same and different means of control should be measured separately. Models C and E combined the family and friends items into one sub-scale whereas Models D and F combined all external means. Model A, which kept all the items associated with external means in separate sub-scales provided a significantly better fit than each of those models. Thus Model A, which incorporates both hypotheses proposed in the introduction provided the best fit of all the models.
The finding that beliefs regarding different means of control are held separately has a number of implications. One implication is support (using a representative sample and CFA) for the validity of multidimensional measures of Locus of Control such as the MHLC (Wallston et al., 1978) . In addition, this analysis provides empirical support for continuing to distinguish the sources of control beliefs. For example, Locus of Control measures have hitherto not distinguished between beliefs that outcomes are controlled by friends and beliefs that outcomes are controlled by family. Rather, these beliefs have been routinely grouped together, not even as 'family and friends' as in the social support field, but as 'powerful others'. Researchers have begun to investigate separate aspects of 'powerful others' through the development of Locus of Control sub-scales for 'God' (Wallston et al., 1999) and 'doctors' (Wallston et al., 1994) and continued testing of these additional sources of control is required. The finding that beliefs regarding different means of control are separate does suggest a practical problem. There is potential for the proliferation of measurement of distinct means of control resulting in unwieldy measurement instruments. It is likely that we will need to be more theoretically specific, and thus choose to measure beliefs about the means of control that are most relevant to a particular research question.
When the sub-scales of the MSOCS were correlated with other measures of control, further support for the differentiation of different means of control was provided. The subscales measuring related means in the MSOCS JOURNAL OF HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 10(5) and MHLC, i.e. internal control, external control and chance were more strongly correlated. When taking the capacity and strategy differences into account an interesting pattern was noted; across the external sub-scales of the MHLC (Powerful Others and Chance), the MSOCS Strategy sub-scales were positively correlated while the Capacity sub-scales were negatively correlated. There are at least two possible ways to focus our interpretation of these relationships for further exploration. First, people who believe that such external means do control outcomes are less likely to believe that they have access to those means. Conversely, those who do have access to external means, such as money, are less likely to believe that these are the means to control health or other positive outcomes. The relationships across the internal sub-scales, in which the same pattern was not found, can add to this interpretation. Both Ability Capacity and Strategy were positively related to the IHLC at a similar strength. It may be said that in western culture, the internal means, such as ability, are generally interpreted as positive, even virtuous attributes, as they were unreflexively by early theorists such as Rotter (1966) . Therefore, it would be congruent for our respondents to believe that ability does control outcomes, while also believing that one has ability. Whereas, to believe that one's good fortune, or wealth, or supportive family, is the reason for one's good health, may be thought to deny the role of the self (whereas those who do not possess wealth, fortune or family are more able to believe that the 'capacity' of these attributes would contribute to better outcomes). Thus, support for an interaction between separate capacity and strategy beliefs is seen. These results specifically suggest that the MHLC external sub-scales are measuring people's beliefs that such means can provide control, but not whether the person believes they have access to those means. Therefore the MHLC which does not differentiate between capacity and strategy cannot fully capture whether respondents do have a sense of control.
In support of the construct validity of the MSOCS capacity sub-scales, two measures of capacity beliefs, Generalized Self-efficacy (internal means) and MOS SSS (social support) did correlate more strongly with Ability Capacity and with Friends Capacity and Family Capacity respectively. In general, it is clear that the strategy and capacity components of these sub-scales are being interpreted differently by respondents and the nature of the existing measures in relation to these constructs could be clarified.
Taken together, the results suggest that multidimensional measures of control are appropriate, further means of control may usefully be investigated and additionally the difference between strategy and capacity beliefs should be taken into account in measurement. The next consideration is that these aspects of control beliefs may have differential effects. Skinner's (1995 Skinner's ( , 1996 theory suggests that not only will these two distinct types of control beliefs provide uniquely useful information but that it is their interaction that will show important effects on outcomes. The support from this study provides encouragement for continued development of multidimensional measures for the purposes of testing the relationships of perceived control with health outcomes in the general population.
A limitation of this study is that the data were not normally distributed. Maximum likelihood estimation, used in the present analysis, is based on the assumption of normality and this raised concerns. One of the problems that arise from non-normal data is that the 2 statistic is inflated and fit indices may be underestimated which means that models that would otherwise meet the standard of absolute fit do not (Hair et al., 1998; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995) . Given the non-normality of the data, two factors give some support for the validity of the results. First, when the analyses were run using 'bootstrapping', which does not assume normality, no difference was found in the results. Second, an increasing number of studies are showing that maximum likelihood estimation techniques perform well under conditions that are not ideal, including non-normality (Hoyle & Panter, 1995) . The results of several studies have suggested that maximum likelihood estimation is remarkably robust even when there is marked departure from multivariate normality (Huba & Harlow, 1987; Olsson et al., 2000; Wang et al., 1996) .
Another concern is the need for crossvalidation. The EFA conducted on a different sample before the CFA on the present sample, the large sample size and the use of the 'bootstrapping' technique, together support the validity of the results. None the less, the measures used in this study are under development and must be examined on other samples to test the validity and generalizeability of the items and responses.
In conclusion, we are confident that these data provide support for the difference between capacity beliefs and strategy beliefs, and for differences between beliefs regarding different means of control. This support is sufficient to claim increasing confidence in the multidimensional nature of the control construct in general. These findings have a number of practical implications for control beliefs research and suggest future avenues of development as we seek to understand the importance of our beliefs about who is controlling our behaviour and directing events and outcomes in our lives. The next challenge is to continue the development of measures suitable for use across clinical settings, in health promotion or to investigate issues of public and population health.
Appendix: MOSC items
Ability Capacity
I'm clever. I've got lots of skills. I'm not a capable person. I'm not very clever. I'm a good problem solver.
Ability Strategy
When I do well, it's because of my skills. It is my ability that determines how things turn out. How things turn out depends on my ability. Doing something well depends on my ability.
Family Capacity
My family is never there for me if I need them. If I wanted them to my family would support me. My family has no interest in my life. My family is willing to help me.
Family Strategy
If my family helps me, things will go well. The experience of my family can really help me succeed in the tough times. 
Luck Strategy
If I fail, it's because I've been unlucky. How things turn out for me is a matter of luck. If I succeed, it's because I've been lucky. I need good luck to succeed.
Money Capacity
I can always get hold of enough money. I never seem to have the money I need. I am pretty well off financially. I'm always short of money.
Money Strategy
If I don't have the money, I can't do what I want to do. If I haven't got the money, life is much harder. To succeed I need to have money. Succeeding depends on how much money I have. If I want to do something well, I need to have money. JOURNAL OF HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 10(5) 
